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Let the “logical propositions” be the logical truths and logical falsehoods. We are reliable 
about logic in the following sense: The logical propositions that we believe (upon 
reflection and discussion) are by-and-large true and the logical propositions that we 
disbelieve (upon reflection and discussion) are by-and-large false.1 This is a striking fact 
about us, one that stands in need of explanation. But it is not at all clear how to explain it. 
So we have a puzzle: How is it that our logical beliefs match the logical facts? How is it 
that we are reliable about logic? 
This puzzle is akin to the well-known Benacerraf-Field problem for mathematical 
Platonism.2 According to that argument, mathematical Platonists are unable to explain 
our reliability about mathematics due to their claim that mathematical objects are 
abstract. In the absence of some amazing cosmic accident, it is difficult to see how we 
could have ended up with the correct mathematical beliefs and practices. This provides 
reason to reject Platonism about mathematics. 
Logic does not have – or at least does not obviously have – a distinctive ontology. 
Nevertheless, the challenge of explaining our reliability about logic is also daunting. 
What gives this reliability challenge its bite is not the ontology of logic but the (apparent) 
                                                 
* This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.) 
Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4. 
1 This characterization of our reliability about logic is broadly analogous to the characterization of our 
reliability about mathematics in Field (1989). 
2 See the introduction and title essay of Field (1989). See Benacerraf (1973) for an important precursor. 
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objectivity of logic.3 We can understand the claim that logic is objective as the 
conjunction of the following three theses:4 First, certain sentences and mental 
representations express logical truths and logical falsehoods. They are therefore both 
meaningful and truth-apt.5 Second, the truth of logical truths and the falsity of logical 
falsehoods do not depend on us. In particular, they do not depend on our thoughts, 
language, or social practices. Third, even if there is, in some sense, a plenitude of 
incompatible logical practices, only one – or a small number of them – is correct.6 
Given the objectivity of logic, it is not at all clear how to explain our reliability. 
The intuitive difficulty is this: We have some understanding of how we could have 
veridical beliefs about non-objective facts. For instance, it is not at all mysterious how Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle could be reliable about what is true in the Sherlock Holmes fiction. 
We also have some understanding of how we could arrive at veridical beliefs about 
objective facts via perception. But this understanding does not extend to the case of logic. 
We do not understand how we could be reliable about objective facts that were not 
learned via some kind of perception. 
This difficulty is potentially very significant. If we were to come to believe that 
there is no satisfying explanation of our reliability compatible with the objectivity of 
logic, this would put pressure on our belief that logic is objective, on our belief that we 
                                                 
3 The same holds true for mathematics. What gives the Benacerraf-Field problem its bite is not the ontology 
but the objectivity of mathematics. Indeed, there is a pressing challenge for any domain such that we think 
(i) we are reliable; (ii) the domain is objective; and (ii) our beliefs about the domain are not generated by 
some kind of perception. 
4 There may be several different philosophically-interesting notions of objectivity. See Schechter (2010) for 
defense of the claim that this is the relevant characterization of objectivity in the context of reliability 
challenges. 
5 To raise a reliability challenge, it suffices that the relevant truth predicate be minimal or deflationary. It is 
not necessary to appeal to a more robust conception of truth. 
6 Notice that the claim that logic is objective does not entail that it is an objective matter whether a truth 
counts as a logical truth. That is, logicality need not be objective. 
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are reliable about logic, or on our general background views about the world. But giving 
up on the objectivity of logic – or on our reliability or our general background views – 
would be devastating to our ordinary ways of thinking. Thus, there is an important 
explanatory challenge to answer. 
In this paper, I examine one candidate answer to this challenge. In particular, I 
pursue the attractive thought that our reliability about logic is to be explained by appeal 
to evolution by natural selection.7 The account is based on two main ideas. The first is 
that our reliability about logic is to be explained by appeal to a more basic competence: 
We are reliable about logic because we are reliable in our deductive reasoning.8 The 
second is that being a reliable deductive reasoner conferred a heritable survival or 
reproductive advantage upon our ancestors. We inherited this trait. This explains how we 
are reliable in our deductive reasoning. 
In the past, when I have presented this view, it has prompted two radically 
different responses. Some have claimed that it is obviously correct: We are the products 
of evolution, and since we are reliable about logic, there must be an evolutionary 
explanation of this fact. Others have claimed that the view is obviously hopeless. As will 
become clear, both reactions are premature. There are several in principle difficulties 
facing evolutionary accounts, but there is reason to believe that they can be addressed. 
The difficulties facing evolutionary accounts are fierce: (i) Even if evolutionary 
accounts can explain why we employ useful cognitive mechanisms, they seem unable to 
                                                 
7 The idea of explaining the reliability of our reasoning by appeal to evolution has a long history. See, for 
instance, Darwin (1871), book I, chapter V. Versions of this view can also be found in Spencer, Mach, 
Avenarius, Boltzmann, Simmel, James, and Dewey, among many others. 
8 Some philosophers and psychologists have claimed that we do not reason deductively but rather employ 
only inductive or abductive patterns of reasoning. I find this view implausible, but cannot argue against it 
here. If this alternative view were instead adopted, many of the same issues would arise. 
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explain why we employ highly reliable ones; (ii) Even if evolutionary accounts can 
explain why we reason reliably about a narrow range of simple propositions – those 
concerning danger, food, reproduction, shelter, and so on – they seem unable to explain 
our reliability concerning propositions of arbitrary complexity and with arbitrary subject 
matters; (iii) Even if evolutionary accounts can explain how we came to employ 
deductive rules of inference that are actually truth-preserving, they seem unable to 
explain how we came to employ rules that are necessarily truth-preserving; Finally, (iv) 
since engaging in deductive reasoning does not yield novel information about the world, 
it is difficult to see how there could be any selective advantage in doing so.9 
The purpose of this paper is to sketch an evolutionary explanation of our 
reliability about logic and to demonstrate how these general difficulties may be 
addressed. I do not claim that every detail of my evolutionary explanation is correct. I do 
not even claim that some evolutionary explanation must be correct. Rather, my main 
claim is that there is no in principle reason to think that evolutionary accounts are 
incapable of explaining why we are reliable about logic. In particular, the account I 
sketch provides one plausible answer to the reliability challenge for logic. It demonstrates 
that there are plausible answers to be had. This defangs the reliability challenge for logic. 
It defuses the tension between the claim that logic is objective, the claim that we are 
reliable about logic, and our general background views about the world. 
                                                 
9 Other alleged difficulties include the following: There is no way to make sense of the distinction between 
selection for accepting the correct logic whichever that is, and selection for accepting a particular logic that 
happens to be correct. See Field (1998), page 19. Evolutionary explanations cannot explain why having 
objective thoughts is within the range of biological options. See Nagel (1986), pages 78–79. The 
probability that any of our cognitive mechanisms is reliable is low, given naturalism and given that we are 
the product of evolution, due to the difficulty of providing a naturalistic account of the role of content in 
causing behavior. See Plantinga (1993), chapter 12. 
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This paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, I further develop the 
reliability challenge for logic. I present what I take to be the crux of the challenge – the 
challenge of explaining how it is that we have a reliable cognitive mechanism for 
deductive reasoning. In section three, I discuss the nature of evolutionary explanations. 
Section four is devoted to sketching an evolutionary explanation of our reliability about 
logic. I first present an explanation of why it is that we possess logical concepts. I then 
present an explanation of why it is that we employ reliable deductive rules given that we 
possess these concepts. In so doing, I address the fourth difficulty listed above. Finally, in 
section five, I answer the remaining three difficulties for evolutionary accounts of our 
reliability about logic. 
 
2. PRELIMINARIES10 
Before developing the reliability challenge for logic, I should first explain what I mean 
by “logic”. Logic, as I use the term here, does not concern artificial formal languages. 
Rather, it concerns propositions that can be expressed in non-technical natural language 
and believed by ordinary thinkers. Certain propositions are logical truths – for instance, 
the proposition that every walrus is a walrus. Other propositions are logical falsehoods – 
for instance, the proposition that some walrus is not a walrus. 
There are many interesting questions that arise concerning the nature of logic. For 
my purposes here, I need not presuppose any particular account. In my discussion, 
however, I will assume that (i) propositions and not sentences are the primary bearers of 
logical truth and logical falsity; (ii) propositions are fine-grained in the sense that there 
                                                 
10 This section presents some of the main conclusions of Schechter (2010). 
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can be distinct logically equivalent propositions; (iii) whether a proposition is logically 
true or logically false depends on its logical form; and (iv) logical truths are necessarily 
true and logical falsehoods are necessarily false, on any reasonable (alethic) kind of 
necessity. I will also assume that classical logic is at least approximately correct. 
As a first pass, the reliability challenge for logic is the challenge of explaining 
why it is that the logical propositions that we believe (upon reflection and discussion) are 
by-and-large true and the logical propositions that we disbelieve (upon reflection and 
discussion) are by-and-large false. Yet, this is not the best way to understand the crux of 
the challenge. This challenge has a straightforward answer. Our reliability about logic can 
be explained by appeal to a more basic competence; we are reliable about logic because 
we are reliable in our deductive reasoning.11 
Consider some moderately complex logical truth, for instance if both A and if A 
then B then B, substituting particular sentences for A and B. We believe this proposition, 
at least upon reflection and discussion. How did we come to believe it? There are many 
possibilities. For instance, we may have learned it from a logic teacher. Or we may have 
observed that B and inferred the conditional from it. However, the canonical way one 
comes to believe this truth is via a chain of reasoning, perhaps one like the following: 
Suppose both A and if A then B. 
 So A. 
 So if A then B. 
 So B. 
So if both A and if A then B, then B. 
 
                                                 
11 This claim is broadly analogous to the suggestion that our ability to reason correctly about metaphysical 
necessity is a byproduct of our more basic ability to reason correctly about counterfactuals. See Hill (2006) 
and Williamson (2007). 
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More generally, we come to believe logical truths and disbelieve logical falsehoods on 
the basis of such deductive reasoning. Our logical beliefs are the outputs of deductive 
reasoning in cases where there are no initial premises. 
It is plausible that whenever thinkers reason in this way, their reasoning depends 
on the employment of rules of inference. In particular, it is plausible that deductive 
reasoning relies on the employment of rules that resemble the rules that that appear in 
natural deduction formulations of logic. On this view, deductive rules include such rules 
as: 
From both p and q, infer p; 
From both p and q, infer q; 
From p and if p then q, infer q; 
From q under the supposition p, infer if p then q. 
 
There are several reasons to think that the rules that we employ in deductive 
reasoning are more complex than the simple rules listed above.12 Nevertheless, it is 
plausible that the rules that we employ are closely related to the standard natural 
deduction rules, and in what follows, I’ll assume that they are.13 
Consider again if both A and if A then B, then B. We believe this proposition 
because we went through a chain of reasoning like the one displayed above. We ended up 
with a true belief because the transitions involved in our reasoning were truth-preserving. 
The transitions were truth-preserving because the deductive rules that governed them are 
                                                 
12 See Harman (1988; 1995). 
13 There is disagreement in the psychological literature over the correct view of deductive reasoning. The 
view assumed here is closest to that of Rips (1994) and Braine and O’Brien (1998). My discussion would 
have to be changed if an alternative view were adopted. But in most cases, the changes would be minimal. 
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reliable. In general, we are reliable in our logical beliefs because we are reliable in our 
deductive reasoning. We employ reliable deductive rules.14 
Of course, providing this explanation does not fully answer the reliability 
challenge for logic. It raises a new explanatory demand. Explanation is now needed of 
how it is that we are reliable in our deductive reasoning. The challenge thus becomes that 
of explaining the reliability of our cognitive mechanism for deductive reasoning. 
What is this challenge? There are two important explanatory questions concerning 
the reliability of our deductive mechanism. They may be stated as follows: 
The Operational Question: How does our cognitive mechanism for 
deductive reasoning work such that it is reliable? 
 
The Etiological Question: How is it that we have a cognitive mechanism 
for deductive reasoning that is reliable?15 
 
To illustrate the distinction between these two questions, it may be helpful to 
compare a different cognitive mechanism – say, vision. Our visual mechanism is reliable 
in the sense that it by-and-large produces true beliefs about our environment. This is a 
striking fact, in need of explanation. Indeed, this fact raises two explanatory questions. 
First, how does our visual mechanism work such that it reliably produces true beliefs 
about our environment? Second, how is it that we have a reliable visual mechanism? The 
answers to these two questions are very different. 
To answer the reliability challenge for logic, satisfying answers to both the 
operational and the etiological questions are needed. The operational question has a 
                                                 
14 There are well-known experimental results showing that humans are prone to errors in deductive 
reasoning. Perhaps the most striking results concerns variants of the Wason selection test. So the claim that 
we are reliable in our deductive reasoning should not be overstated. But these errors seem largely to be 
performance errors. The rules built into our deductive competence are reliable. 
15 The etiological question can be interpreted in two ways – as concerning ontogeny or as concerning 
phylogeny. To fully answer the reliability challenge, both questions require answers. But the ontogenetic 
question is philosophically not very pressing. The development of a reliable deductive mechanism is 
presumably genetically encoded. The philosophically pressing question concerns phylogeny. 
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straightforward answer: Our deductive mechanism works via the employment of rules of 
inference. This mechanism is reliable because the deductive rules of inference that we 
employ are necessarily truth-preserving. They are guaranteed to yield true beliefs from 
true beliefs.16 That’s all that needs to be said. We need not claim that our deductive 
mechanism somehow tracks the logical facts. 
The etiological question, however, cannot be answered so easily. To answer this 
question, an explanation is needed of how it is that we have a reliable cognitive 
mechanism for deductive reasoning. In particular, an explanation is needed of how it is 
that we employ reliable deductive rules. There does not seem to be a quick explanation of 
this fact. This is the crux of the reliability challenge for logic. 
It is important to recognize that this explanatory demand is not generated by some 
overly powerful epistemological principle that quickly leads to radical skepticism. For 
instance, we need not accept the claim that thinkers must possess an explanation of how it 
is that they have a reliable cognitive method in order to be justified in employing the 
method. Rather, the motivating line of thought is simply this: It is a striking fact that we 
have a reliable cognitive mechanism for deductive reasoning. This is a fact that “cries 
out” for explanation. Ceteris paribus, it is a cost of a theory if it treats some striking 
phenomenon as merely accidental or otherwise inexplicable. Thus, it would be very 
unsatisfying to be forced to claim that it was a brute fact – an amazing cosmic accident – 
that we employ reliable deductive rules. If that were the only available account, there 
would be a tension in our overall view of the world. There would be pressure to somehow 
                                                 
16 This claim must be generalized to handle deductive rules that involve propositional attitudes other than 
belief. Let’s say that believing a proposition is correct if the proposition is true, disbelieving a proposition 
is correct if the proposition is false, believing a proposition under a supposition is correct if the proposition 
is true if the supposition is, and so on. Our deductive rules of inference are reliable in the sense that they 
necessarily preserve correctness. I leave this generalization implicit in what follows. 
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modify our view. This is why a substantive answer to the etiological question is sorely 
needed. 
 
3. EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATIONS 
Perhaps the most natural approach to answering the reliability challenge for logic – that 
is, for answering the etiological question for deductive reasoning – is to appeal to 
evolution by natural selection. Evolution by natural selection works as follows: There is 
initially a population of organisms. Each organism has a genetic endowment, its 
genotype. Each organism also has phenotypic traits that depend in part on its genotype, 
and so are heritable. There is variation in the genotypes and phenotypic traits among the 
organisms in the population. Organisms with certain phenotypic traits tend to be better at 
survival and reproduction than the rest, given their background environment. Over time, 
these fitter organisms survive longer and reproduce more frequently than less fit 
organisms. This yields a change in the gene frequency of the population and a 
corresponding change in the frequency of phenotypic traits.17 
According to the most straightforward kind of evolutionary explanation of why a 
phenotypic trait came to predominate in a population, possessing the trait enhanced the 
fitness of the ancestors of the population (in their background environment). In the case 
of interest, the relevant trait is that of employing reliable deductive rules. On the most 
straightforward evolutionary explanation of why our population came to employ reliable 
deductive rules, then, our ancestors were selected for employing reliable deductive rules 
                                                 
17 There are biological mechanisms of evolution other than natural selection, such as random drift. I focus 
on natural selection because such non-selective mechanisms cannot play the central role in a satisfying 
explanation of our reliability. (Lamarkian inheritance, if it were to exist, could also play such a role.) 
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– a heritable trait – and this explains why it is that we, their descendants, employ reliable 
deductive rules. 
An evolutionary account of our reliability about deduction is attractive because it 
is plausible that employing reliable deductive rules can confer survival and reproductive 
advantages on an organism. For instance, if an organism believes that a predator is either 
in this grove of trees or that grove, and then comes to learn that the predator is not in that 
grove, it is advantageous for the organism to come to believe that the predator is in this 
grove. An evolutionary account is also attractive because it fits well with the general 
scientific picture of our place in the world. 
It may seem strange to discuss evolutionary explanations of traits such as 
employing reliable deductive rules. Whether a rule is reliable is not, in some sense, a 
purely biological fact. It might seem more promising to consider the trait of employing 
some particular collection of rules. But this line of thought is mistaken. Employing 
reliable deductive rules is a phenotypic trait like any other. There is no reason to suppose 
that evolutionary explanations are unable to explain the presence of such traits. 
Moreover, if we only provided an explanation of how we came to employ some particular 
collection of deductive rules, we would not answer the reliability challenge for logic. 
Even though we would have explained why we employ the particular rules, and even 
though it is a necessary truth that those rules are reliable, we would not have explained 
why we employ reliable rules. Explanation is not closed under necessary entailment.18 
The explanation of our employment of the rules would presumably have nothing to do 
with their reliability. The reliability of our deductive rules would still seem accidental in 
a worrisome way. 
                                                 
18 See Schechter (2010), page 447, for an example. 
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There are several ways in which this simple evolutionary account of our reliability 
could be modified. For instance, it could be claimed that our ancestors were directly 
selected not for employing reliable deductive rules, but for possessing linguistic abilities 
that required or led to the possession of reliable deductive rules. It could be claimed that 
our ancestors were selected for employing reliable non-deductive learning mechanisms 
that can be used to acquire reliable deductive rules. It could be claimed that our ancestors 
were selected to easily adopt reliable deductive rules when taught them by confederates.19 
Or it could be claimed that cultural evolution rather than biological evolution was 
primary. It is worth emphasizing that it is not part of my task here to reject any of these 
suggestions. My goal is only to sketch one plausible explanation of the reliability of our 
deductive rules and show how seemingly powerful difficulties for it may be addressed. 
The main point of this paper is to provide something like a demonstration of possibility 
(or of plausibility) and not of actuality. 
Before filling in more of the details of the evolutionary account, it is important 
that it first be made clear what natural selection can – and cannot – explain. To this end, it 
is helpful to consider a simple toy example. 
Suppose that we have very many different sets of fair dice. Let us assume that 
each set contains five dice and that the sets differ in color. So there are five bright red 
dice, five faded blue dice, five forest green dice, and so on. Suppose that we roll each of 
the dice simultaneously and select the sets of dice that come up all sixes. That is, we keep 
the sets of dice that come up all sixes and dispose of the rest. 
                                                 
19 This suggestion is related to the Baldwin effect – the idea that there might be selection for organisms that 
can more easily learn certain abilities and then, only later, for organisms that have those abilities innately. 
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If asked why the current population contains sets of dice that came up all sixes, 
we can provide an explanation involving selection: There were very many sets of dice 
and the ones that came up all sixes were selected. In contrast, there is no selective 
explanation of why some particular set of dice – say the faded blue dice – came up all 
sixes. That was purely a matter of chance. 
This toy example involves artificial selection, not natural selection. Yet, the point 
generalizes. Natural selection can help to explain why organisms with a certain 
phenotypic trait came to predominate in a population. It cannot explain why a particular 
organism has the trait in question.20 Instead, the explanation of that fact depends on other 
processes. Novel phenotypic traits arise in a population on the basis of genetic mutation 
and recombination. These mutations are due to stray cosmic rays, errors in replication, 
and other chance events. These traits are then passed on from organisms to their 
descendants.21 The explanation of how a particular organism came to have a phenotypic 
trait thus does not involve selection but heredity and extremely chancy events. 
It is important to be careful here. Natural selection can help to explain why a 
novel phenotypic trait arose in the population. Previous bouts of selection could have 
made it very likely that the trait would emerge.22 But what selection cannot do is explain 
why a particular individual has the trait in question. 
This feature of selective explanations might provoke the following worry: To 
fully respond to the reliability challenge, one must provide a satisfying explanation both 
of why the population primarily includes thinkers who employ reliable deductive rules 
                                                 
20 See Sober (1984), section 5.2. 
21 I am here ignoring the complexities that arise from the impact of the environment on phenotypic traits 
and from the existence of sexual reproduction. These complexities do not affect the points to follow. 
22 See Neander (1995). Neander also claims that selection can explain why a particular organism has a 
phenotypic trait. I don’t see why this further claim is true. 
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and of why particular thinkers employ reliable deductive rules. Whatever the prospects 
are for an evolutionary account to meet the first demand, it is unable to meet the second. 
And it would be highly unsatisfying to be forced to think that it was merely an accident 
that each individual thinker employs reliable deductive rules. The claim that it was 
merely an accident would produce a tension in our overall view of the world. 
While this worry is arresting, it is ultimately misguided. The primary fact to be 
explained is a population-level fact – our population primarily includes thinkers that 
employ reliable deductive rules. To illustrate this point, suppose that there were a vast 
population of heterogeneous thinkers, each with a different set of inferential rules. 
Suppose that a few of these thinkers had reliable deductive rules, and that the number of 
such thinkers was roughly what one would expect if the rules were somehow distributed 
randomly. If the few reliable individuals had no other striking properties in common, we 
would not think that their reliability was particularly in need of explanation. Nor would 
we find it troubling if it turned out to be merely an accident that they were reliable. 
(Compare: Given that we have many sets of dice, it is not striking that some particular set 
came up all sixes. What is striking is that every set of dice in our possession came up all 
sixes.) This suggests that the reliability of a particular individual is not in general a 
striking fact. What is striking is the reliability of the population at large. 
There is a complication, however. Consider the first-personal claim that I employ 
reliable deductive rules. It is intuitive that this is a striking fact. At the very least, this fact 
seems more in need of explanation than the claim that some arbitrary particular 
individual is reliable. When I reflect on my own reliability, it is hard to be satisfied with 
the thought that it was merely a lucky fluke that I am reliable. Since an evolutionary 
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account cannot explain this first-personal fact, we again have a worry about the prospects 
of an evolutionary account. 
I’m not entirely sure what to make of this concern. There is reason to be cautious 
here. It is not entirely clear that we should endorse the intuition that it is a striking fact 
that I am reliable. It is not obvious that my winning the lottery would be any more 
striking than the fact that some particular person won the lottery. And even if the first-
personal fact is a striking fact, it might not be a big cost of a view to claim that this fact 
came about merely by accident. But it should be granted that there are murky waters 
here.23 
Putting the first-personal case aside, assuming that an evolutionary account of the 
reliability of our population can be made to work, the fact that it is accidental that 
particular thinkers employ reliable rules is not worrisome. But can an evolutionary 
account of the reliability of our population be made to work? 
 
4. AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION OF OUR DEDUCTIVE RELIABILITY 
Deductive rules are rules of inference that govern reasoning with logical concepts. One 
natural strategy for explaining why it is that we employ reliable deductive rules is to 
divide the task into two parts. The first is to explain why it is that we possess logical 
concepts. The second is to explain, given that we possess logical concepts, why it is that 
we employ reliable deductive rules. In this section, I sketch an evolutionary account with 
this bipartite structure. According to this account, possessing logical concepts and 
                                                 
23 In conversation, David Christensen has suggested that although selection cannot explain the first-
personal fact that I have a reliable deductive mechanism, it nevertheless raises its probability. While this 
seems true, it does not assuage the worry. The general principle of theory choice generating the reliability 
challenge concerns explanation and not probability. 
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employing reliable deductive rules both conferred survival advantages on our ancestors. 
This explains why it is that we have these phenotypic traits. 
 
4.1. THE ADVANTAGES OF POSSESSING LOGICAL CONCEPTS 
On the proposal under consideration, possessing logical concepts conferred a survival or 
reproductive advantage on our ancestors. But it is prima facie puzzling what this 
advantage could be. The main difficulty is as follows: It is tempting to think that the 
inputs from the world (via perception) to our reasoning faculties are logically simple. It is 
also tempting to think that our behavior and behavioral dispositions depend only on the 
logically simple products of our reasoning. Given these two assumptions, it is plausible 
that being able to hold logically complex beliefs can confer a selective advantage only if 
such beliefs are important as intermediate steps in our reasoning. But this is apparently 
ruled out by the fact that logical concepts are conservative in the following sense:24 
Adding logical concepts (along with the associated deductive rules) to any conceptual 
practice involving only logically simple propositions does not license any inferences 
from logically simple premises to logically simple conclusions that were not already 
licensed before the addition.25 
In response, it might be suggested that possessing conservative concepts can be 
advantageous in another way – namely, by enabling thinkers to reason in a quicker or 
                                                 
24 Conservativeness (or a related property) is often taken to be a necessary condition on logical 
constanthood. This proposal stems from the Gentzen-Prawitz tradition of requiring the introduction and 
elimination rules of a logical concept to appropriately match each other, and from the suggestion in Belnap 
(1961) that a conceptual role bestows a genuine meaning on a logical constant only if it satisfies a 
conservativeness requirement. Hacking (1979) demarcates the logical, in part, by appealing to 
conservativeness. See Dummett (1991) and Tennant (1987) for relevant discussion. 
25 In the absence of a detailed list of the deductive rules we employ, a rigorous proof of conservativeness is 
not possible. But this claim, or a related one, is undoubtedly correct. 
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more efficient manner than they would otherwise be able to.26 But this suggestion does 
not help for the case of logical concepts. Adding logical concepts (with the associated 
deductive rules) to a conceptual practice does not speed up derivations of logically simple 
conclusions from logically simple premises. 
In answer to this difficulty, I suggest that the two tempting thoughts ought to be 
rejected. Logically complex beliefs can be inputs to reasoning, delivered by perception or 
other non-inferential cognitive mechanisms. This is perhaps clearest for conjunctive 
propositions. Our visual system binds together different features of an object and delivers 
beliefs in conjunctions, such as the proposition that a given object is both round and red. 
Beliefs delivered by perception may be logically complex in other ways, too. Consider, 
for instance, negative existential propositions. It seems that just by looking – without any 
inferential reasoning – I can come to believe that there is no dog in my office.27 Similarly, 
perhaps thinkers can directly come to believe disjunctive propositions on the basis of 
perception, such as the proposition that a certain object is either blue or green.28 Perhaps, 
too, thinkers can directly come to believe general propositions, such as the proposition 
that every book on the top shelf is blue. Moreover, if beliefs acquired through testimony 
are not based on inference, arbitrary logically complex beliefs may be inputs to 
reasoning. On the basis of logically complex inputs to reasoning, thinkers may reason to 
logically simple conclusions and behave accordingly. 
                                                 
26 Compare: Mathematical theories may be useful when added to nominalist physical theories by shortening 
the derivation of purely nominalist physical consequences from nominalist physical claims. See Field 
(1980). 
27 It might be claimed that my belief that there is no dog in my office is not solely based on perception, but 
also on a default presumption that what I don’t see isn’t there. This view faces several difficulties. But even 
if some version of it is correct, the default presumption is itself a logically complex input to reasoning. 
28 See Dummett (1991), page 267, for the claim that perceptions can be disjunctive. Dummett’s example is 
that Hardy may not have been able to tell whether Nelson said, “Kismet, Hardy” or “Kiss me, Hardy”, but 
may have had a perception with an “irreducibly disjunctive form”. 
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Logically complex beliefs can also be important in guiding behavior, and not 
merely by virtue of their logically simple consequences. For a mundane example, 
suppose that I am searching for a glass of water. Holding the disjunctive belief that a 
glass contains either water or vodka should have a different impact on my behavior than a 
belief in either of the disjuncts. If I were to believe that the glass contains water, I should 
pick up the glass and abandon my search. If I were to believe that it contains vodka, I 
should ignore it and continue my search. But if I were to believe the disjunction, I should 
examine the liquid more closely, perhaps take a sip, and perform other appropriate tests.29 
Similarly, holding the negative belief that there is no glass of water nearby should 
motivate me to search elsewhere. Holding the conditional belief that if there is a glass of 
water nearby then it is in my office should motivate me to look in that location. In 
general, possessing logical concepts enables thinkers to represent important information 
about the world, information of use in guiding behavior. 
There is a natural picture of the representational abilities provided by the logical 
concepts. Consider the space of all (metaphysically or epistemically) possible worlds. We 
can think of each logically simple proposition as picking out a region of this space – 
namely, the worlds at which the proposition is true. The logical concepts enable us to 
pick out additional regions of this space in our thought. Conjunction enables us to take 
the intersection of regions. Disjunction enables us to take the union of regions. Negation 
enables us to take the complement of a region. And so on. Being able to pick out these 
                                                 
29 For an analogous example, see Skyrms (1999). In discussing a hypothetical group of logically 
sophisticated vervet monkeys, Skyrms claims that the optimal evasive action given knowledge that there is 
either a snake or a leopard nearby may be different both from the optimal action given the knowledge that 
there is a leopard nearby and from the optimal action given the knowledge that there is a snake nearby. 
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additional regions of modal space helps us to represent information that we acquire from 
the world and make use of in guiding our behavior. 
As we will see below, this picture is much too crude. But it provides a useful 
initial account of the role of the logical concepts in thought. 
It is interesting to note that it is not necessary for a thinker to possess logical 
concepts in order to have the representational abilities they provide. For instance, instead 
of believing of something that it is either blue or green, a thinker could believe that it is 
blue-or-green, where blue-or-green is a concept that applies to blue things and to green 
things. Instead of believing that it is not the case there is a chair here, a thinker could 
believe that it is un-chaired here, where un-chaired is a concept that applies to locations 
lacking chairs. Similar claims hold for more complex logical constructions. Instead of 
possessing a few general purpose logical concepts, thinkers could possess a bevy of 
special purpose concepts. However, this does not provide an objection to the claim that 
possessing logical concepts can be evolutionarily advantageous. It would be 
computationally very costly for a thinker to dispense with general-purpose logical 
concepts in favor of a large number of special purpose concepts. Moreover, to have the 
representational abilities that logical concepts provide, such a thinker would have to add a 
potentially unbounded number of additional concepts whenever a new concept was 
acquired. 
There is an additional proposal about the advantage of possessing logical concepts 
that merits discussion. This is the idea (inspired by the work of Brandom) that the role of 
logical concepts is to enable thinkers to “make explicit their implicit inferential 
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commitments.”30 The idea here is that thinkers are disposed or committed to infer in 
certain ways. Logical concepts provide thinkers with the conceptual resources needed for 
subjecting these commitments to rational scrutiny. Consider, for instance, the conditional. 
In believing if A then B, a thinker makes explicit her commitment to inferring B from A.31 
This belief can then be assessed by considering reasons for and against it. If the latter are 
more persuasive than the former, the belief – and the inference – may be rejected. 
Adapting this view to an evolutionary context, the idea is that possessing logical concepts 
such as the conditional conferred a survival advantage because they enabled our 
ancestors to hold up their inferential commitments to rational scrutiny, and thus enabled 
them to improve their methods of reasoning about the world.32 
This suggestion is appealing. It is plausible that an important role of logical 
concepts is to allow thinkers to better assess their inferential practices and commitments. 
However, the proposal need not be seen as a competitor to the idea that the function of 
the logical concepts is to enable thinkers to represent facts about the world that they 
                                                 
30 See Brandom (2000, introduction and chapter 1). Brandom’s view concerns logical vocabulary rather 
than logical concepts. 
31 This is reminiscent of the view in Ryle (1950) that conditionals are inference tickets. Brandom 
sometimes writes that the job of conditionals is to enable speakers to say that certain inferences are 
acceptable. Presumably, this should be construed in a loose sense. “If A then B” does not say anything 
about an inference (provided that neither A nor B do so). Rather, it says something about the world. The 
best way to understand Brandom's view, I take it, is that in stating “if A then B”, a speaker asserts 
something about A and B, and in so doing also expresses a commitment to the correctness of the inference 
from A to B. 
32 Consider the following conditional: If Sally is deceiving me, I’ll never believe that she is (because she is 
so clever). Presumably, a thinker can sensibly believe this conditional without being committed to reason 
from the antecedent to the consequent. So there seems to be a counterexample to this view of conditionals. 
(This kind of example is originally due to Thomason. See van Fraassen (1980), page 503, for the 
attribution.) There are several things that can be said in reply. One could claim that a thinker who endorses 
the conditional does express a commitment to make the corresponding inference but loses this commitment 
upon coming to believe the antecedent. Alternatively, one could modify the view by claiming that in 
endorsing a conditional, a thinker expresses a commitment to viewing the corresponding inference as a 
good inference (but does not necessarily express a commitment to drawing the inference). Finally, it could 
be claimed that the semantics of conditionals and the selective advantage of possessing the conditional 
come apart. Although endorsing a conditional does not always go along with a commitment to reasoning 
from the antecedent to the consequent, it typically does. This is enough to explain why possessing the 
conditional conferred a survival advantage. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue. 
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would not otherwise easily be able to represent. Possessing logical concepts may have 
conferred a survival advantage both because they improved our ancestors' 
representational abilities and because they helped our ancestors better assess their own 
patterns of reasoning. There is no need to choose between these two suggestions.33 
 
4.2. THE ADVANTAGES OF EMPLOYING RELIABLE DEDUCTIVE RULES 
We see, then, that possessing logical concepts can confer an evolutionary advantage. 
What about the employment of reliable deductive rules? This question raises an old 
problem about deduction. The problem is to explain the point of deductive inference.34 
Deductive inference does not augment our knowledge of the world. In an intuitive sense, 
the conclusion of a deductively valid inference does not contain any information not 
already contained in the premises. This claim has a formal analogue: The set of possible 
worlds at which the conclusion is true is a superset of the possible worlds at which all of 
the premises are true. What, then, could the purpose of deductive inference possibly be? 
How could there be an evolutionary advantage in employing reliable deductive rules? 
One strategy for answering this question is to appeal to some version of 
Conceptual Role Semantics. On this view, for a thinker to possess a concept, she must 
employ certain associated rules of inference or belief-forming methods. Assuming that 
Conceptual Role Semantics holds true for logical concepts, it is plausible that the 
deductive rules we employ are concept-constituting of the logical concepts we possess. 
                                                 
33 Here are two additional proposals: First, possessing logical concepts is needed to engage in certain kinds 
of non-deductive reasoning, such as inference to the best explanation. Second, possessing logical concepts 
such as the conditional enables thinkers to appropriately hedge their beliefs and avoid unnecessary error. 
The latter suggestion is related to the discussion of the conditional in Boghossian (2003). 
34 This problem goes back at least as far as Mill (1843), II.3.1. 
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So any advantages there are for possessing logical concepts are also advantages for 
employing the associated deductive rules. 
Although this strategy has some appeal, there are reasons for doubt. First, 
Conceptual Role Semantics is subject to many difficulties, and may well be false.35 
Second, the explanation is intuitively the “wrong way around”. On many versions of 
Conceptual Role Semantics, possessing a concept consists in employing certain rules. So 
one would expect the evolutionary advantages of possessing a concept to derive from the 
advantages of employing its associated rules, and not vice-versa. Finally, and more 
importantly, the strategy is at best able to explain how it is we employ particular 
deductive rules – those constitutive of the particular logical concepts we possess. It is 
unable to explain how it is we employ reliable deductive rules. The reliability of the rules 
plays no obvious role in the explanation.36 The explanation makes it seem to be merely an 
accident that we came to employ reliable deductive rules.37 
There is a better strategy for explaining the evolutionary advantage of employing 
reliable deductive rules. A preliminary point to make is that information from the world 
does not come to us all at once in a single package. We acquire it over time and from 
disparate sources. Deductive reasoning can help us combine new information with old 
information. It can help us combine information from different sources. It can also help 
us to reassess old information or to apply old information to new situations. 
                                                 
35 For some of the difficulties, see Block (2000), Fodor and Lepore (1991), and Williamson (2003). 
36 To be fair, on some versions of Conceptual Role Semantics, constitutive rules are required to be truth-
preserving. For instance, see Peacocke (1992). However, there are compelling counterexamples to this 
claim. See Boghossian (2003) and Schechter and Enoch (2006) for discussion. 
37 A more plausible suggestion is that the selective advantage of possessing logical concepts required their 
constitutive rules to be reliable. This suggestion is compatible with the one to follow. 
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Yet, simply saying this does not suffice to explain the evolutionary advantage of 
employing reliable deductive rules. When a thinker employs a reliable deductive rule to 
combine bodies of information or to draw out a consequence of some body of 
information, the thinker is not acquiring any novel information. All of the relevant 
information is already present, at least on a coarse-grained understanding of 
“information”. So what could the evolutionary advantage of employing a deductive rule 
be? 
The answer to this question must be this: Employing reliable deductive rules helps 
thinkers to convert information into a more usable form. To illustrate, suppose again that 
I am searching for a glass of water. Even if I were to come to believe both that there is a 
glass of water located either here or over there and that the glass of water is not located 
here, I would not immediately be motivated to look for it over there. In order for me to be 
so motivated, I would first have to draw the relevant inference. I would have to come to 
explicitly believe that the glass of water is over there. This is so despite the fact that the 
information that the water is over there is implicit in my original beliefs. (This point is 
still more striking for cases where the relevant sequence of deductive inferences is very 
long.) In general, rational behavior depends not only on the information a thinker 
possesses, but also the manner in which it is represented. 
This shows that the natural picture of the role of the logical concepts in thought 
presented above – in terms of picking out regions of modal space – is too crude. 
Logically equivalent propositions can be importantly different in their relevance to 
behavior. A deductive consequence of some premise may pick out a larger region of 
modal space than the premise, but may also be directly relevant to an urgent matter in a 
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way that the premise was not. Part of the role of the logical concepts, then, is to represent 
information in specific ways. Deductive rules of inference are important because they 
enable us to manipulate the ways that information is represented. 
The proposal, then, is this: Employing reliable deductive rules enables thinkers to 
better make use of the information they possess in guiding their behavior. This is why 
employing reliable deductive rules conferred an evolutionary advantage on our ancestors. 
 
5. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
We have, then, a (very rough) sketch of an evolutionary explanation of our reliability 
about logic. We possess logical concepts and employ reliable deductive rules because this 
conferred an evolutionary advantage on our ancestors. Possessing logical concepts 
enabled our ancestors to represent important information about the world as well as to 
assess their own patterns of reasoning. Employing reliable deductive rules enabled our 
ancestors to better make use of the information in their possession. Our reliability about 
logic is a side-effect of our employment of reliable deductive rules. 
It may be worthwhile to here repeat an earlier point: My discussion is only 
intended to provide a sketch of an account. To fill out the explanation would require a 
considerable amount of empirical work. For instance, one might want to look into the 
following issues: How is it that our cognitive mechanisms are genetically encoded? How 
is it that natural selection works on the mind? What are the intermediate forms between 
animals not possessing cognitive mechanisms for deductive reasoning and animals that 
do possess such mechanisms? Why are humans special in having such powerful cognitive 
capacities? What is the specific role of each individual logical constant and each 
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individual deductive rule in our thought? What are the costs of having a cognitive 
mechanism for deductive reasoning? And so on. 
It is not one of the tasks of this paper to answer these interesting and important 
empirical questions. The central goal of this paper, rather, is to address the reliability 
challenge for logic and to thereby ward off the pressure on our belief that logic is 
objective, on our belief that we are reliable, and on our general background views about 
the world. This is a task in the epistemology of logic. Providing a plausible sketch of an 
explanation, even at a high level of generality, is sufficient for achieving this goal. 
There are, however, several pressing objections that can be raised against 
evolutionary accounts of our reliability about logic. These objections purport to show that 
such accounts cannot even in principle explain our reliability about logic. In this section, 
I discuss the most serious of these objections. I show how they may best be addressed. 
The objections fall into two categories. The first concerns whether evolutionary accounts 
can explain the full extent of our reliability. The second concerns whether evolutionary 
accounts can explain our reliability at all. In responding to these objections, I further 
develop the evolutionary account. 
 
5.1. GENERALITY, COMPLEXITY, AND NECESSITY 
One difficulty for evolutionary explanations of our reliability is that they seem unable to 
explain the full extent of our reliability. It is plausible that our ancestors were selected for 
correctly reasoning only about certain domains. Presumably, what natural selection 
“cares about” is that our ancestors formed true beliefs about danger, food, mating, shelter, 
and other topics closely tied to survival and reproduction. Perhaps when sexual selection 
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is taken into account, the list can be somewhat expanded. But even if it can, it is clear that 
our ancestors were not selected for correctly reasoning about algebraic geometry, the 
Problem of the Many, the geology of Mars, or how best to make a cheese soufflé. 
Evolutionary accounts thus seem unable to explain how it is that we employ deductive 
rules that are reliable for arbitrary subject matters.38 
A second difficulty concerns the complexity of propositions. It is plausible that 
our ancestors were selected for reasoning correctly only with relatively simple 
propositions. Presumably, there was little survival advantage in reasoning correctly with 
highly complex propositions. Evolutionary accounts thus seem unable to explain how it is 
that we employ deductive rules that are reliable when applied to propositions of arbitrary 
complexity. 
A third difficulty comes from the reaches of modality. The reliability of our 
deductive mechanism is not merely a matter of its yielding true beliefs from true beliefs. 
Our deductive mechanism is reliable in a modally robust sense – the rules we employ 
necessarily preserve truth. Evolutionary accounts seem unable to explain this fact. 
Success in survival and reproduction depends only on reasoning in ways that are truth-
preserving in the actual world, and not on reasoning in ways that would be truth-
preserving even in far off possible worlds.39 
                                                 
38A related worry appears in Delbrück (1978), page 353, and is discussed in Sober (1981). Delbrück’s 
worry concerns the mechanisms used in scientific reasoning. Nagel (1986), page 79, argues against 
evolutionary explanations of our capacity for objective thought on the grounds that “our capacity to form 
cosmological and subatomic theories takes us so far from the circumstances in which our ability to think 
would have had to pass its evolutionary tests….” Field (1989), pages 28–29, argues against evolutionary 
explanations of our reliability about mathematics on the grounds that only a small portion of mathematics is 
tested against the world. 
39 Nozick (2001), page 122, and Stroud (1981) argue that evolutionary accounts make it difficult to see how 
we could be reliable in our attributions of necessity, since selection only rewards believing truths about the 
actual world. This objection is different from the one I discuss. I do not here consider the status of 
attributions of modal properties. 
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Indeed, when carefully evaluated, it seems incoherent to claim that our ancestors 
were selected for employing deductive rules that are necessarily truth-preserving. A 
necessary condition for there to have been selection for a trait is that the presence of the 
trait caused the relevant organisms to survive longer or reproduce more frequently. How 
could it be that a modal property was causally efficacious in this way? 
In response to the third of these difficulties, one might try to deny that our 
deductive rules are reliable in a modally robust sense. Perhaps the deductive rules we 
employ would be truth-preserving if the world were only slightly different, but would not 
be truth-preserving if the world were radically different.40 However, this response is 
unattractive. Adopting it would be tantamount to giving up on many of our modal beliefs: 
If we were to believe that even our deductive rules are not necessarily truth-preserving, 
we should believe that we are not at all reliable about what is necessarily the case. 
Moreover, an analogous response cannot be used to answer the first difficulty. It 
would be extremely difficult to maintain that our deductive rules produce true beliefs 
when reasoning about predators but not when reasoning about other topics, such as how 
to get an astronaut to the Moon. Such a view conflicts with the success we have had in 
many of our endeavors. Such a view is also potentially self-undermining: Any belief that 
we are unreliable concerning subject matters that were not of immediate evolutionary 
relevance should undermine our trust in the very reasoning that produced the belief. 
There is no plausible way to argue that our ancestors were selected for reasoning 
correctly about arbitrary subject matters, with propositions of arbitrary complexity, and in 
                                                 
40 A related proposal is put forward by Nozick (1993), page 111, who suggests that the explanation of why 
logical principles seem self-evident may be that “they are true, even if only contingently, even just ‘true 
enough’ … and that they have held true durably for long enough to leave an imprint upon our evolutionary 
endowment.” This is reminiscent of the view in Mill (1843), II.6.2, that arithmetic is contingent but appears 
necessary due to our “early and constant experience”. 
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a way that works in arbitrary possible worlds. The answer to the three difficulties must 
instead be that these features of our deductive rules are byproducts of the traits for which 
our ancestors were really selected. Our ancestors were selected for employing deductive 
rules that actually are truth-preserving for a limited range of propositions. Our ancestors 
were also selected for employing rules that are computationally efficient, have few 
storage costs, and the like. A good way to satisfy these constraints is to employ deductive 
rules that work generally and necessarily, and this explains why our ancestors came to 
have such rules. 
This response might be thought to be somewhat disappointing. What we were 
after was a satisfying explanation of how we came to have generally and necessarily 
truth-preserving deductive rules, and the evolutionary explanation on offer claims only 
that this is a side-effect of something else. But this disappointment should be fleeting. 
There is nothing inherently problematic about the style of explanation offered. Indeed, 
evolutionary biologists are familiar with numerous examples in which the most plausible 
explanation of some trait is that it is a side-effect of what was really selected for.41 
What would be unsatisfying is if it were claimed that our employment of reliable 
deductive rules was a side-effect of a trait that was not directly related to reliability, such 
as the trait of having large ears. This would make it seem accidental that we came to 
employ deductive rules that work generally and necessarily. But the explanation under 
consideration makes no such claim. The trait of employing rules of inference that are 
truth-preserving in a limited range of cases is closely tied to the trait of employing rules 
                                                 
41 Gould and Lewontin (1978) use the word “spandrels” to refer to traits that are not selected for but are 
side-effects of how an organism develops or is built. 
 
 29
that generally and necessarily preserve truth. The proposal thus provides a satisfying 
answer to the three difficulties. 
 
5.2. USEFULNESS AND TRUTH 
The final difficulty for evolutionary accounts of our reliability is the most general. 
Namely, even if an evolutionary account can explain why we have useful cognitive 
mechanisms, it is not clear it can explain why we have cognitive mechanisms that are 
truth-conducive. 
A version of this objection has been forcefully presented by Stich.42 Stich directly 
argues only that natural selection does not guarantee that our cognitive mechanisms 
generally produce true beliefs (given the appropriate inputs). This conclusion is 
unobjectionable. But if his arguments can be extended to support the claim that natural 
selection is unlikely to yield cognitive mechanisms that generally produce true beliefs, 
this would count against an evolutionary explanation of our reliability. 
Stich argues for two claims. First, evolution does not always yield the optimal 
mechanism for a task. That is, it does not always produce a mechanism that provides the 
greatest contribution to fitness when compared to alternatives. Second, optimal cognitive 
mechanisms are not always the most reliable. Features other than truth-conduciveness 
may be more important to fitness. 
In support of the first claim, Stich presents several reasons why evolution does not 
always yield an optimal design: An optimal mechanism may not be biologically possible. 
                                                 
42 See Stich (1990, chapter 3). Stich does not challenge the view that our cognitive mechanisms are the 
products of evolution, but rather the view that “evolutionary considerations impose interesting limitations 
on irrationality.” Churchland (1987) argues that there is a significant gap between behaving in a way 
conducive to survival and having mostly true beliefs. 
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It may not be biologically possible for a population to evolve an optimal mechanism 
given its current characteristics. Random genetic drift may lead to the disappearance of 
an optimal mechanism from a population or may hamper its spread. The complexities of 
sexual reproduction may do so, as well. 
Stich is undoubtedly correct that evolution does not always maximize fitness. 
However, Stich provides no reason to believe that evolution is unlikely to provide 
mechanisms that substantially enhance fitness. Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate how 
well Stich's considerations apply in the particular case of interest. Not much is known 
about the evolution of the brain, and more specifically, the evolution of cognitive traits. It 
is an open question whether any of the factors Stich discusses were of any real 
importance in the evolution of our reasoning mechanisms. 
In support of the second claim, Stich argues that there is frequently a tradeoff 
between how truth-conducive a cognitive mechanism is and how economical the 
mechanism is with respect to the amount of energy, time, and cognitive hardware that it 
requires. It may be more important to an organism's survival that a cognitive mechanism 
be “fast and frugal” than that it be generally accurate. In addition, there may be a tradeoff 
between the number of false positives and the number of false negatives that a cognitive 
mechanism produces. It may be very important to avoid one of these – for instance, false 
negatives concerning the existence of lurking predators – at the cost of substantially 
increasing the other.43 
Again, it is undoubtedly correct that the fittest cognitive mechanism is not always 
the most truth-conducive. Yet, there are general reasons to think that the gap between the 
two is not as large as Stich's discussion might lead one to expect. All things being equal, 
                                                 
43 As Stich notes, these points are originally due to Sober (1981). 
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correctly representing the world is conducive to survival; it helps organisms react to 
threats and achieve important goals.44 It seems likely that the cognitive mechanisms that 
evolution produces are at least somewhat truth-conducive in a central range of cases. 
There is also reason to believe that Stich's considerations carry less force for the 
particular case of deductive reasoning. The structure of logical entailments is relatively 
simple. Indeed, cooking up rules that resemble the deductive rules we employ but which 
are not universally or necessarily truth-preserving would seem to require adding ad hoc 
conditions or otherwise increasing their complexity. So for the specific case of deductive 
reasoning, there seem to be no additional computational costs in employing fully truth-
conducive rules over somewhat-but-not-fully-truth-conducive rules. There may be no less 
reliable but more economical cognitive mechanism in the ballpark. Moreover, deductive 
reasoning is a general-purpose reasoning mechanism. So there is little pressure for it to 
minimize false positives at the expense of false negatives, or vice-versa. There is no 
obvious reason for selection to yield any systematic bias for one over the other. 
There is an additional point to make in response to Stich's claim. Namely, there is 
reason to think that that there was in fact selection pressure for the employment of 
deductive rules that are highly truth-conducive in an important range of cases. 
In general, it can be advantageous for organisms to have cognitive mechanisms 
that are highly truth-conducive albeit slow or inefficient. In certain circumstances – 
where energy and time is available, the stakes are high, and the relevant issues are tricky 
– it can be important not to form beliefs rashly, but rather to have a more considered 
                                                 
44 Stich (1990, chapter 5), argues that it is not at all valuable to have true beliefs. His argument depends on 
the difficulty of assigning truth conditions to mental states in a privileged way. This is a deep issue in the 
philosophy of mind and cannot be addressed here. 
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response. This is a point familiar from everyday life, and it extends to the context of 
evolutionary fitness. 
Deductive reasoning has the hallmarks one would expect of a cognitive 
mechanism that was selected for playing this role. Deductive reasoning is relatively slow, 
at least compared to instinctive responses or the application of simple heuristics. Its 
outputs are only indirectly tied to behavior. It is content-neutral, capable of representing 
and transitioning between a large range of contents. And it is highly reliable. What these 
features suggest is that our deductive mechanism was designed to get it right when 
getting it right is very important and time is not of the essence.45 
This suggestion fits well with “dual process” theories in psychology, according to 
which we possess two cognitive systems.46 System 1 is a relatively fast, cognitively 
undemanding, automatic reasoning system that makes use of special-purpose heuristics. 
System 2 is a relatively slow, cognitively demanding, general-purpose system for explicit 
reasoning. Our mechanism for deductive reasoning is a part of System 2. This system is 
highly reliable, at least in an important range of cases. 
The claim, then, is that one of the functions of our deductive mechanism requires 
it to be highly truth-conductive for some range of cases. This raises the question: What is 
that function? Above, I proposed that the evolutionary advantage of employing deductive 
rules is that they enable thinkers to convert information into a form that makes it 
available for guiding behavior. This goes some way towards answering the question. But 
                                                 
45 Papineau (2000) argues for an analogous view about a different cognitive mechanism. He claims that we 
have a specialized means-end reasoning module that selects the best course of action in the light of the 
available information when “the stakes are high and time does not press.” 
46 See Evans and Over (1996) and Sloman (1996). 
 
 33
the question remains: For what purpose (or purposes) did our ancestors need to represent 
logically complex information and manipulate it in a highly truth-conducive way? 
There is one suggestion that I find both plausible and illuminating. Namely, 
employing highly truth-conducive deductive rules conferred a selective advantage on our 
ancestors because it helped them to successfully engage in long-term planning.47 
There are two types of long-term planning. The first is what might be called 
“strategic planning”. This is the sort of planning a thinker engages in when constructing a 
strategy for governing her actions over some stretch of time in order to achieve some 
desired end. The second is what might be called “contingency planning”. This is the sort 
of planning a thinker engages in when constructing a plan for handling potential future 
emergencies or opportunities. 
Three general features of long-term planning suggest a connection with our 
employment of reliable deductive rules. First, long-term planning typically relies on 
many different pieces of information, provided by many different cognitive mechanisms. 
This suggests that deductive reasoning plays an important role in long-term planning; 
such reasoning enables thinkers to combine the relevant information and transform it into 
a more usable form. 
Second, long-term planning is an important cognitive endeavor, one in which the 
benefits of success and the costs of failure can be high. We do not always have the time 
or energy to deliberate about what to do at the time we need to act; long-term planning 
enables us to ameliorate the impact of such resource constraints. Such planning also 
enables us to better coordinate our actions (with ourselves and with others); it increases 
                                                 
47 I originally owe this suggestion to Paul Boghossian. 
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the likelihood that we will achieve important ends.48 This suggests that success in long-
term planning provides a significant evolutionary advantage. 
Finally, when engaging in long-term planning, there is typically little need to 
make an immediate decision. This suggests that there is little selection pressure against 
the employment of relatively slow cognitive mechanisms in planning, at least so long as 
there are compensatory benefits. 
Taken together, these three features suggest that there was a strong selective 
pressure for the employment of highly truth-conducive cognitive mechanisms to use in 
such planning, even if such mechanisms are slower or less efficient than alternatives. The 
proposal, then, is that our ancestors were selected for employing highly truth-conducive 
deductive rules in part because it helped them engage in long-term planning.49 
Other proposals can also be envisioned. For instance, a currently fashionable view 
is that many of our cognitive abilities were developed to help with the complexities of 
living in social groups. On one version of this proposal, our cognitive abilities were 
developed to help to help compete with conspecifics for limited resources.50 On a 
different version of this view, our cognitive abilities were developed to help cooperate 
with conspecifics in engaging in complicated cooperative endeavors such as foraging.51 
Alternatively, it could be that employing highly truth-conducive rules was important for 
the task of constructing explanations of important phenomena – such as the causes of 
certain animal traces.52 A still different proposal is that our cognitive abilities are the 
product of sexual selection. Being able to reason clearly and in a truth-conducive way 
                                                 
48 These claims about the importance of planning are due to Bratman (1987; 2000). 
49 Similar remarks can be made about deliberation more generally. 
50 See, for instance, Humphrey (1976) and Flinn, Geary, and Ward (2005). 
51 See Sterelny (2003; 2007). 
52 Carruthers (2002b) suggests that explanatory reasoning originally emerged to help hunters track animals. 
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were indicators of the fitness or an organism, and so organisms that were more intelligent 
were favored as mates.53 There are many other alternatives, too. Many of these views 
have the resources to explain why we came to employ highly truth-conducive cognitive 
mechanisms for deductive reasoning. 
The general moral to draw is not that any particular view (or views) ought to be 
adopted. Rather, it is that natural selection can sometimes yield highly truth-conducive 




On the proposed account, we are reliable in believing logical truths and disbelieving 
logical falsehoods because we have a reliable mechanism for deductive reasoning. The 
explanation of how we came to have a reliable deductive mechanism is an evolutionary 
one. Our ancestors were selected for possessing logical concepts. Possessing these 
concepts conferred an evolutionary advantage because it enabled our ancestors to 
represent important information about the world and because it aided them in assessing 
their own patterns of reasoning. Our ancestors were also selected for employing 
deductive rules that are truth-preserving in an important range of cases. Employing such 
rules enabled our ancestors to convert information into a form that was more useful for 
guiding their behavior. (According to one proposal, it was advantageous for our ancestors 
to do this in a highly truth-preserving way because of the importance of long-term 
planning.) There was an additional selection pressure on our ancestors, namely, to 
                                                 
53 See Miller (2000). 
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employ rules that are cognitively economical. As a byproduct of these pressures, our 
ancestors came to employ rules that are generally and necessarily truth-preserving. 
Employing reliable deductive rules is a heritable trait, and so we came to employ them, 
too. 
On this proposal, our reliability about logic is a byproduct of a byproduct. It is a 
byproduct of the general reliability of our cognitive mechanism for deductive reasoning. 
This in turn is a byproduct of what was really selected for – an economical cognitive 
mechanism that is highly reliable in a central range of cases. 
This proposal provides a satisfying answer to the reliability challenge for logic. It 
demonstrates that there are plausible answers to be had. Whether or not the precise details 
of the account are correct, it shows that there is no in principle reason to think that 
evolutionary accounts are incapable of explaining our reliability about logic. This defuses 
the tension between the claim that logic is objective, the claim that we are reliable about 
logic, and our general background views about the world.54 
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